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Abstract—The cyber-physical nature of the smart grid has
rendered it vulnerable to a multitude of attacks that can occur
at its communication, networking, and physical entry points.
Such cyber-physical attacks can have detrimental effects on
the operation of the grid as exemplified by the recent attack
which caused a blackout of the Ukranian power grid. Thus,
to properly secure the smart grid, it is of utmost importance
to: a) understand its underlying vulnerabilities and associated
threats, b) quantify their effects, and c) devise appropriate
security solutions. In this paper, the key threats targeting the
smart grid are first exposed while assessing their effects on the
operation and stability of the grid. Then, the challenges involved
in understanding these attacks and devising defense strategies
against them are identified. Potential solution approaches that can
help mitigate these threats are then discussed. Last, a number of
mathematical tools that can help in analyzing and implementing
security solutions are introduced. As such, this paper will provide
the first comprehensive overview on smart grid security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Realizing the vision of a smart electric grid is contin-
gent upon the effective integration of new information and
communication technologies into the traditional generation-
transmission-distribution physical systems. This, in turn, will
give rise to a cyber-physical power system known as the smart
grid (SG) in which a cyber layer that handles computations,
communication, and data exchange, is tightly coupled with the
physical system which handles the generation, transmission,
and distribution of electric power as shown in Fig. 1.
Despite the significant advantages introduced by this cyber-
physical coupling, the resulting dense interconnectivity be-
tween various SG elements and the increased reliance on its
cyber system makes the grid more vulnerable to a multitude
of cyber-physical attacks (CPAs) that aim at compromising its
functionalities. This increased SG vulnerability is corroborated
by the recent discovery of the control system malware, known
as Stuxnet [1], which targets programmable logic controllers
(PLCs) of industrial systems giving the adversary the ability
to have control over the physical system. The fear of such
threats has peaked after the first CPA-induced Ukranian black-
out which has recently affected 225,000 customers spanning
several Ukranian cities [2]. Clearly the security of the smart
grid as one of the most critical technical challenges facing its
deployment [3].
With such culminating risks, identifying and understanding
potential threats which can target the SG is essential to achieve
a more secure grid. This identification enables devising new
security measures and strategies to thwart such attacks and
make the grid more robust and resilient. However, due to the
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a smart grid architecture highlighting the underlying
cyber layer and security threats.
complex and large-scale nature of the SG, various challenges
accompany these diagnostic and corrective efforts.
The main contribution of this article is to provide the first
comprehensive overview on the security threats facing the SG.
In particular, the goal of this paper is threefold:
1) identify and explore the CPA threats which can target
the smart grid,
2) discuss the unique challenges of analyzing SG security
problems, and,
3) propose solution approaches and analytical frameworks
which can help in analyzing the security of the SG and
devising proper defense strategies.
In a nutshell, due to its necessity for all facets of daily life
activities, interrupting the supply for electricity emerged as a
lucrative target for adversarial activities. Insuring the sustain-
ability and availability of electricity supply via SG functions
is imperative but challenging as it requires a comprehensive
knowledge of the various aspects of SG security. To this end,
this paper aims at providing an inclusive investigation of the
various security threats, challenges, and solutions pertaining
to SG security.
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II. SMART GRID SECURITY THREATS
Given its cyber-physical nature, the SG will inherit physical
and dynamic system threats as well as well-known communi-
cation and network threats such as those targeting its integrity
and availability1. However, the goals of such attacks will
significantly differ from those sought by adversaries targeting
classical cyber systems, such as communication networks. For
instance, an attack on the SG primarily aims to disturb the
operation of the physical generation, transmission, and distri-
bution systems by exploiting their reliance on their underlying
cyber layer. This is in contrast to conventional network attacks
which typically seek to solely cause some sort of damage to
or interruption of the cyber layer’s functionality. The key SG
security threats are discussed next.
A. Integrity
Integrity refers to the credibility of the data collected and
transferred over the grid. Attacks that target this integrity can
cause false estimation of the real-time state of operation of the
system as well as lead to the unobservability or even instability
of the system. Next, we present two key types of integrity
attacks.
1) Data injection attacks (DIAs): DIAs consist of an ad-
versary manipulating exchanged data such as sensor readings,
feedback control signals, and electricity price signals. Such at-
tacks can be done by compromising the hardware components
(as in the case of Stuxnet), or intercepting the communication
links. The most studied type of DIAs is the one that targets
the grid’s state estimator. The states of a power system consist
of the voltage magnitudes and phase angles at every bus.
Estimation of these states enables complete monitoring of the
power and current flows throughout the grid.
To estimate these states, a number of measurements are
collected from around the grid which include real and reactive
power flows over transmission lines or injected/withdrawn at
buses, voltage magnitudes, and, due to the placement of phasor
measurement units (PMUs), synchronized voltage and current
phase angles. The collected measurements are then fed to a
state estimator which, using a maximum likelihood estimator,
generates real-time estimates of the states which are used for
operational and pricing purposes.
Therefore, manipulating the collected measurements results
in a false estimate of the state of operation of the system.
In turn, such false states can lead to incorrect operational
actions whose effects can range from inducing incorrect
pricing to destabilizing the power system. In practice, a
bad data detection (BDD) mechanism is deployed to detect
outliers. However, the authors in [4] showed the existence of
a stealthy data injection attack model that can manipulate the
state estimation outcome without being detected by common
BDD mechanisms. The effects of such attacks vary widely
depending on the goal of the attacker.
• System damage: Some DIAs are primarily concerned with
damaging the system and have a purely destructive nature,
1Privacy is yet an important facet of smart grid security that is out of scope
of this article due to space limitations.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
Bus
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
 P
ric
e 
($/
MW
h)
 
 
Post−attack
No Attack
3.7 $/MWh
30% Profit
+27%
4.82 $/MWh
Fig. 2. Electricity price manipulation using data injection attacks.
such as in terrorist attacks. For example, an attacker
can manipulate system measurements so that a congested
transmission line falsely seems to not have reached its
thermal transmission limit. Thus, based on these false
estimates, the system operator would route more power
over the line which leads it to over-heat and sag. This
sagging reduces the distance in between the line and
ground (or other objects in between) which can trigger
a line to ground fault. Under stress conditions, such a
fault can induce large fluctuations in system dynamics
that can lead to tripping additional lines, disconnecting
generators, load shedding, or even a system blackout.
• Financial benefit: Real-time pricing in electricity markets
is based on the state estimator’s real-time estimate of
the state of operation of the system. Thus, corrupting
the state estimates using DIAs leads to manipulation of
the electricity prices in a way that is lucrative to the
attacker [5].
This is illustrated in Fig. 2 which corresponds to a
DIA targeting measurements of three line flow measure-
ments over the IEEE 30-bus test system. Clearly, without
any attack, the prices are equal throughout the system.
However, the attack successfully manipulated the prices
causing, for example, a 27% increase in the price at bus
7. Thus, suppose that the attacker is a market participant
who sells power at bus 7 and buys the same amount of
power at bus 20. As seen in Fig. 2, without any attack, this
transaction generates no profit. However, in the presence
of an attack, the participant reaps a 30% profit from this
transaction.
Beyond targeting the state estimator, data injection attacks
can target wide area protection, monitoring, and control
(WAPMC) schemes which rely on global data collected from
around the system to detect the occurrence of a disturbance
and take corrective actions to stop its propagation. In this
regard, manipulating the exchanged data can lead to a false
characterization of a disturbance leading to false disconnection
of lines, generators, or loads [6].
2) Time synchronization attacks: To better monitor the
grid, there has been an increased use of PMUs – high-speed
measurement units (typically 30-60 samples/second) capable
of measuring the voltage and current phasors as well as local
frequencies. Given that the measurement devices are spread
around the system, sending their collected measurements to
data concentrators or control centers is subject to transmission
delays. Therefore, in order to properly align and analyze the
measurements, all the collected PMU data are synchronized
based on a time reference provided by a global positioning
system (GPS) signal. This time referencing provides a time
stamp to each collected measurement. The high speed sam-
pling capabilities and, most importantly, the synchronization
between the collected measurements enable accurate real-time
wide area monitoring, protection, and control of the SG.
Here, an adversary can manipulate the time reference of the
time stamped measured phasors to create a false visualization
of the actual system conditions thus yielding inaccurate control
and protection actions. Attacks that target PMU time synchro-
nization are known as time synchronisation attacks (TSAs) [7].
Using TSAs, the GPS signal is spoofed and counterfeited
by the attacker so that PMU sampling is done at the wrong
time hence generating measurements with wrong time stamps.
Recent results in [7] have shown that TSAs can produce
significant fault location errors which can go up to 180 km
for a line of length 400 km and even trigger a false alarm
regarding the presence of a fault. This false alarm can result in
a disconnection of a transmission line which can then trigger
a cascading chain of failures across the grid. Such a false
disconnection was one of the main culprits that led to the
North American Northeast blackout in 1965 [6].
B. Availability
Availability pertains to the accessibility to every grid com-
ponent as well as to the information transmitted and collected,
whenever needed. Attacks compromising this availability are
known as denial of service (DoS) attacks that can block key
signals to compromise the stability of the grid and observabil-
ity of its states.
In this regard, maintaining generation-load balance is essen-
tial for the SG operation. Indeed, the angular frequency of a
synchronous generator is based on the difference between the
electric power it serves and the input mechanical power of its
turbine provided by, for example, burning fuel or coal. For the
generator to retain constant angular frequency, its mechanical
power should always match its connected electric load. Thus,
if the mechanical input is kept constant, an increase in the
electric load leads to a drop in angular frequency while a
decrease in load leads to a rise in frequency. Consequently,
generators are equipped with local and global control systems
that typically follow a three-layer design as shown in Fig. 3
to maintain a constant frequency.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the three-layered control architecture of a smart grid:
∆fi is the deviation in frequency within PSi from the nominal frequency (60
Hz in most of North and South America, 50 Hz in most other areas of the
world), and ∆Ptie,1-2 is the deviation in power flowing over the tie-lines from
the scheduled value. Generators 1 and 2 are part of PS1.
The first layer consists of a local primary proportional
controller which aims at adjusting the mechanical power
of the generation to match the changes in electric load.
This proportional control reduces the frequency deviation but
maintains a steady state error. To eliminate this steady state
error, a central integral control is used in which various
generators participate. This integral control represents the
secondary control layer. The tertiary control, corresponds to a
supervisory control responsible for allocating enough spinning
reserve and for optimally dispatching the units participating
in the secondary control. Moreover, the SG consists of an
interconnection of many power systems which are connected
using tie-lines. Thus, a deviation in frequency at one system
triggers deviations in the power flowing over the tie-lines.
Consequently, a control scheme known as power-frequency
control regulates the tie-line power flow based on the sensed
frequency deviations.
Therefore, the dynamic stability of the grid is crucially
dependent on the availability of the sensor measurements and
control signals provided by the three layers of control. In fact,
using DoS to block the primary control signal and prevent
it from decreasing the mechanical input power following a
drop in the load leads to the acceleration of the generator
and its shut down by an over-frequency relay. Moreover, a
DoS blocking secondary control from eliminating steady state
frequency errors can lead to the loss of synchronism between
generators. Analogously, blocking tertiary control can have
similar effects and can lead to suboptimal operation incurring
large monetary losses.
This hence also sheds light on the difference between threats
on the SG as a CPS and threats pertaining to conventional
cyber systems. In fact, compromising availably can destabilize
the SG. In contrast, a DoS may not, in most cases, stop the
operation of a cyber system, but it will typically incur delays.
C. Additional Dynamic System Attacks
As a dynamic control system, various dynamic system at-
tacks (DSAs) can be launched at the SG. One well investigated
such type of attacks is known as replay attacks (RAs) which
can have serious effects on system stability [8]. In RAs, the
adversary injects input data in the system without causing
changes to the measurable outputs. To launch this attack, an
adversary compromises sensors, monitors their outputs, learns
from them, and repeats them while injecting its attack signal.
Another type of DSAs is known as dynamic data injection
attacks (D-DIA) which uses knowledge of the grid’s dynamic
model to inject data that causes unobservability of unstable
poles [9]. As a result, a successful D-DIA prevents the grid’s
operator from detecting instability which, in turn, can lead to
a system collapse. A covert attack is one other type of DSAs
that is basically a closed loop version of an RA [9].
D. Physical Threats
Given the wide footprint over which the power system is
physically spread, the danger of physical attacks in which
an adversary physically attacks a physical component such
as a generator, substation, or transmission line is prominent.
For example, components can be physically attacked remotely
using a rifle as was the case in a sniper attack which targeted a
substation in California in 2013 [10]. Another type of physical
attacks consists of physical manipulation of smart meters for
energy theft purposes.
E. Coordinated Attacks
The power system typically incorporates robustness mea-
sures that helps it survive potential failures. Under typical
system conditions, an attack leading to the failure of one or few
components might not always have significant effects on the
grid’s operation. For example, the power system follows the
so-called “N−1” security criterion which instills redundancies
in the system design allowing the preservation of the system’s
state of normal operation even after the loss of one of its N
components.
However, coordinated attacks (CAs) can still be launched by
resourceful adversaries that exploit the dense interconnections
between grid components to launch simultaneous attacks of
different types targeting various components. For example,
the recent CPA-caused blackout of the Ukranian grid is a CA
which concurrently targeted three power distribution compa-
nies. The adversary compromised a number of their computers
to gain control of the SCADA system to simultaneously
disconnect around 27 substations [2].
CAs are the most challenging types of attacks since they can
surpass traditional reliability and robustness design solutions
and require a multi-layered security solution approach.
Table I summarizes the discussed threats, their associated
security types, and their main potential SG targets.
III. CHALLENGES
The aforementioned threats naturally give rise to a number
of key challenges, as detailed next.
A. Limitation of Traditional Cyber Security Solutions
Existing cyber security solutions that have been devised
for cyber systems are invaluable for improving SG security.
For example, existing intrusion detection and cryptographic
solutions will certainly contribute towards better grid security.
However, some of these solutions might not be directly appli-
cable to the SG due to a number of reasons:
1) Presence of a physical system: existing cyber security
solutions do not consider the presence of a physical
system. However, as discussed in Section II, one of the
main goals of attacks on the SG is to damage to the
physical system. Thus, SG attacks are designed based
on the physical effects that they can cause. Therefore,
any security solution that does not directly account for
the physical system is simply not adequate for defending
the smart grid.
2) Risk management and diffusion: the analysis of the
propagation of attacks in a physical system is different
from that corresponding to cyber systems. For instance,
the study of how computer malware propagates in a
cyber system is different from how failures cascade and
propagate throughout a dynamic CPS such as the SG.
B. Limitations of Existing Reliability Evaluation Solutions
There exists several studies for improving the power sys-
tem’s reliability and availability via various means such as
improving redundancies and maintenance processes. Such ex-
isting reliability designs are primarily concerned with studying
failure events which are likely to occur up to a certain level.
However, a CA can cause various coordinated failures, as
discussed in Section II-E, that have very low probability
of naturally happening and, as such, they are not typically
accounted for in reliability analyses. In fact, the cyber layer
has provided an increased reachability for the adversaries
using which various components that are located at separated
geographic locations can be concurrently targeted.
C. Limitations of Conventional Control-Theoretic Solutions
Conventional control-theoretic security analyses are pri-
marily concerned with designing robust controls which can
preserve operational requirements in face of exogenous dis-
turbances. However, such analyses do not explicitly account
for the cyber layer and all the underlying cyber threats that it
can introduce to a CPS such as the SG.
D. Tradeoff Between Security and Performance
SG security solutions must be inherently cognizant of the
performance of the system. In particular, these solutions must
seamlessly integrate with the grid with minimal disruption
to its operation and performance. This tradeoff between se-
curity and performance is much more pronounced in the
SG, compared to communication networks, due to the CPS
TABLE I
SG SECURITY THREATS
Threat Label Security Breach Type Main SG Target
Data injection attacks (DIA) Integrity State estimator, WAPMC
Time synchronization attacks Integrity PMUs, WAPMC
Denial of service attacks Availability Primary, secondary, and tertiary controls, WAPMC
Dynamic system attacks Dynamic integrity Primary, secondary, and tertiary controls
(Dynamic DIA, Replay, Covert)
Physical destruction Physical Physical system components
Meter manipulation Physical Smart meters
Coordinated attacks All of the above All of the above
nature of the grid. For example, the best security strategy to
thwart cyber attacks from penetrating the grid is to completely
eliminate wireless and Internet connectivity. Even though
this will improve the security of the grid, it will deprive it
from all the economic and operational advantages that the
cyber layer introduces. Thus, finding the best security strategy
while meeting stringent performance requirements is a key
challenge.
E. Aging Components
One of the reasons that renders SG security even more
challenging is that most of the components of the system were
designed and implemented decades ago. Hence, at the time of
their design, cyber layer integration had not been proposed yet;
and thus, the security threats that it introduces had not been
anticipated. Therefore, patching mechanisms to accommodate
for the newly introduced threats are of high importance and,
undeniably, pose serious challenges.
IV. SOLUTION APPROACHES
Given the culminating threats facing the SG, security so-
lutions must be developed to thwart potential attacks and
maintain the operation of the grid. In particular, due to the high
complexity involved, a systematic approach for securing the
system is needed. To this end, a proposed systematic approach
is illustrated in Fig. 4 and is detailed next.
A. Prevention Phase
The prevention phase involves reinforcing the security of the
system to prevent any attack from successfully intruding and
intervening in its operation. Here, various types of analyses
can be performed:
1) Vulnerability assessment and risk management: vulner-
ability assessment consists of determining which grid
components are vulnerable to which types of threats.
Using past data, the SG operator can identify which
components have historically been subject to which
attacks. For example, since spoofing attacks targeting
GPS signals are common, PMUs are expected to be
vulnerable to spoofing and TSAs [7]. Moreover, the
vulnerability of some components can be also analyzed
analytically and experimentally. For example, a non-
encrypted sensor data is vulnerable to RAs given that
the attacker can easily learn a sequence of previously
generated data and repeat it. Similarly, a meter unpro-
tected with firewall that is connected to the Internet will
be vulnerable to data injection attacks.
Risk management uses vulnerability assessment results
and combines them with an estimation of the effect that
a vulnerability can have on the SG. Risk management
in SG includes two key tasks:
a) Contingency analysis: assessing the effect that the
loss of a component such as a transmission line,
generator, transformer, or sensor, can have on the
dynamic stability and operating state of the grid.
b) Cascading failures analysis: analyzing the propa-
gation of failures over the grid.
The later requires understanding the interdependencies
between the various grid elements to anticipate the
cascading chain of events that may occur when some
components are lost. For example, the loss of a trans-
mission line in heavy loaded conditions might lead to
cascading failures resulting in a blackout while the loss
of another line might have unnoticeable effects.
Vulnerability assessment and risk management are con-
tinuously evolving processes using which the operator
continuously learns about potential threats and vulnera-
bilities so as to improve its protection of the system.
2) Security reinforcement: once threats and their associated
effects are characterized, policies for reinforcing the grid
security must be derived. However, such reinforcement
procedures are typically subject to budgetary and in-
vestment constraints. Thus, the results obtained from
vulnerability and risk management can be used to create
a ranking of the most critical components to protect first.
Security reinforcement can include encrypting a number
of sensor readings, replacing some meters with more
sophisticated and capable models [5], replacing wire-
less with wired communication, or implementing robust
control designs. Security reinforcement is a robustness
measure which aims at securing the grid against a range
of potential threats.
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Fig. 4. Flowchart illustrating a systematic approach for the defense of the
grid against CPAs.
B. Scanning and Detection
Vulnerability assessment, risk management, and security
reinforcement constitute a preventive measure to thwart poten-
tial attacks which can target the grid. However, they cannot
completely secure the grid against all types of attacks for two
main reasons:
1) Undiscovered threats: there are many emerging vulnera-
bilities and attack strategies of which the operator might
not be aware.
2) Budget constraints: budgetary constraints can limit the
volume of possible security reinforcement implementa-
tions.
Therefore, the operator must continuously scan the system
to detect new threats which have passed the attack prevention
defense lines. This is crucial for stealthy and advanced per-
sistent threats which penetrate the system and run long-term
stealthy attacks that cannot be obviously identified.
Various detection mechanisms have been studied in liter-
ature with each focusing on detecting a type of SG attacks.
For example, the work in [11] provides a methodology for
detecting stealthy data injection attacks targeting the state esti-
mator while the authors in [12] propose a detection mechanism
against TSAs targeting PMUs. Moreover, the authors in [8]
propose a detection mechanism against replay attacks.
C. Mitigation, Elimination, and Restoration
Once an attack is detected using detection mechanisms or
by witnessing an apparent damage to the grid, mitigating the
effect of the attack and eliminating it become essential for
restoring the normal operating state.
1) Mitigation: during the occurrence of an attack, mitiga-
tion measures can be deployed to reduce its effect on
the system. Mitigation techniques may include: a) power
system protection techniques which can be used for
stopping the propagation of disturbances, b) spinning re-
serves or distributed generation which can be leveraged
to meet the loss of generation, c) load shedding which
disconnects a part of the total load in order to prevent
a complete collapse of the system, and d) islanding
which splits the grid into small disjoint systems to stop
the propagation of failures and dynamic disturbances.
Mitigation techniques are forms of resilience measures
in which the system sacrifices some operational quality
to decrease the risk of a complete collapse.
2) Elimination and Restoration: to restore the normal op-
erating state of the system once an attack is detected,
taking prompt actions to eliminate it becomes critical.
Elimination can be done by various means such as
replacing compromised components or updating their
software. After threat elimination, SG elements that had
been disconnected such as transmission lines, genera-
tors, and loads can be reconnected to restore normal
operation.
After an attack, the operator’s knowledge about this attack
and the vulnerabilities of the system as well as the ways
of detecting and mitigating this attack evolves. Therefore,
this allows for the operator to update its defense policies to
improve the security of the grid.
Table II summarizes the discussed threats, challenges, and
solutions while providing relevant comments. To successfully
analyze SG security and deploy the aforementioned solutions,
a number of analytical frameworks can be leveraged, as
discussed next.
V. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR SMART GRID
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Implementing effective SG security solutions requires ana-
lytical frameworks which enable modeling of the grid’s cyber
and physical systems and their tight coupling, the interde-
pendency between various grid components, and the decision
making processes of the operator and attackers.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF SG SECURITY THREATS,
CHALLENGES, AND SOLUTIONS.
Threats
Integrity attacks Data injection attacks.Time synchronisation attacks.
Availability attacks Denial of service attacks.
Dynamic system attacks
Replay attacks.
Dynamic data injection attacks.
Covert attacks.
Physical attacks Physical damage.Meter manipulation.
Coordinated attacks Multiple concurrent types and targets.
Challenges
Limitation of cyber security solutions Presence of physical system.Different risk propagation mechanisms.
Limitation of reliability evaluation solutions Presence of unlikely coordinated failures.
Limitation of conventional control-theoretic solutions Presence of cyber layer.
Tradedoff: security vs. performance Security must preserve operational requirements.
Aging components Old equipments: need security patching.
Solutions
Prevention Vulnerability assessment and risk analysis.Security reinforcement.
Detection Focus: stealthy and persistent threats.Constraints: budget.
Mitigation, elimination, and restoration
Mitigation: block propagation, leverage reserves.
Elimination: Update compromised components.
Restoration: reconnect disconnected components.
In addition to using solutions from information security,
power system protection, control theory, and reliability evalu-
ation, additional analytical tools are very useful in modeling
and studying SG security problems as discussed next.
A. Modeling Using Networked Control Systems
Networked control systems (NCSs) [13] combine commu-
nication and information technologies with control system de-
signs to model CPSs such as the SG. Indeed, in NCSs, a shared
communication network is responsible for the communication
between the various sensors, actuators, and controllers in the
CPS. As a result, NCSs can be used to model the cyber-
physical nature of the smart grid which is extremely important
for studying potential threats and deriving appropriate security
solutions for the SG.
B. Graph-Theoretic Techniques
Given that the SG is a networked cyber-physical system
(NCPS), graph-theoretic techniques can be useful to model
the network interconnectivity between the grid components.
In fact, a graph is represented by a set of vertices and
a set of edges connecting these verticies. For SG security
applications, the verticies can represent components such as
generators, transformers, loads, or meters. while edges can
model the interconnectivity between these components. The
modeling of this interconnectivity can consider real, physi-
cal connectivity between the components [14] or functional,
logical connectivity modeling the interdependencies between
those components [6].
Hence, graph-theoretic methods are very useful for under-
standing the networked nature of the SG and analyzing the
interconnectivity between its elements to shed light on the
threats facing the grid and their propagation.
C. Game-Theoretic Techniques
Game theory is a set of mathematical tools used to analyze
strategic interaction and decision making between entities, re-
ferred to as players, with interconnected, conflicting or aligned,
interests. In a typical SG security setting, an attacker aims
to choose an attack strategy to maximize the damage caused
to the grid while the operator (defender) aims at choosing
a defense strategy to minimize the damage to the system.
Thus, due to the conflicting objectives of the attackers and
defenders, game-theoretic techniques [15] provide invaluable
tools to model their optimal decision making and hence finding
the best defense strategy given the potential strategies of the
attackers.
Various works have applied game-theoretic techniques to
the analysis of smart grid security problems. For example, our
recent work in [5] used game theory to characterize the best
set of meters to defend in order to thwart data injection attacks
which can be carried out by multiple adversaries.
VI. FUTURE OUTLOOK
In this paper, a comprehensive analysis of the various SG
security threats, incurred challenges, and potential solutions
have been investigated. This analysis paves the way for more
in-depth investigations of each of the discussed threats and
their correlations in order to quantize their combined effects
on the SG. This will enable devising appropriate solutions
against coordinated attacks which threaten the sustainability
of current and future smart grids.
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